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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
Vol. 60 DECEMBER 1961 
SOME PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 
BEFORE THE LABOR ARBITRATORt 
R. Jifl. Fleming* 
No. 2 
If a bus driver is disciplined for careless driving and the com-
pany wants to support its action by showing past misconduct, is 
such evidence admissible before the labor arbitrator'! 
If a tug company discharges an engineer for letting the boat 
fill with water and his attorney wants to see transcripts of contem-
poraneous interviews conducted by the company before conduct-
ing his cross-examination, is he entitled to them'! 
If a checker in a super-market is discharged for dishonesty and 
the company's evidence comes wholly from an unidentified agent, 
is the checker entitled to confront and cross-examine her accuser 
in the ensuing arbitration proceeding? 
Can evidence which is illegally obtained through wiretapping 
be admitted in an arbitration proceeding to sustain a discharge? 
These are real questions with which arbitrators are struggling 
every day. Moreover, the way in which they are answered says a 
good deal about the arbitration process. And now that the Su-
preme Court has, through the Steelworker Trilogy,1 so greatly in-
creased the stature of labor arbitration, it behooves both arbi-
trators and the parties to re-examine continually the system of 
private jurisprudence which they are building. 
Legal rules of evidence do not, of course, apply before the 
labor arbitrator.2 This is not surprising since such rules were de-
t This article is the outgrowth of a study financed by the Labor Project of the Fund 
for the Republic. To find out how arbitrators were handling various problems a series 
of hypothetical problems was devised and then discussed with arbitrators at seminars 
held in Boston, Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and New York. Sub-
sequently a summary of the findings was prepared and sent to members of the 
National Academy of Arbitrators asking them to express agreement or disagreement. 
• Professor of Law, University of Illinois.-Ed. 
1 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel 8: Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United 
Steelworkers v. Warrior 8: Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. 
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) • 
2 ELKOtllU 8: ELKOUR.I, How ARBITRATION WoRKS 173 (rev. ed. 1960). 
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veloped in connection with jury trials, and do not apply strictly 
in any tribunal but a jury-court. 3 The whole theory of the arbitra-
tion tribunal is that it is composed of experts who repeatedly in-
quire into a relatively homogeneous kind of cases. Exclusionary 
rules are hardly required as a precautionary measure. Indeed, as 
the late Harry Shulman said in his classic Oliver Wendell Holmes 
lecture at Harvard in 1955, "The more serious danger is not that 
the arbitrator will hear too much irrelevancy, but rather that he 
will not hear enough of the relevant.''4 
But it is not toward common-law rules of evidence, in general, 
that this inquiry is directed. Rather, it is toward specific rules 
which may apply in the sensitive area of individual rights. Broadly 
stated this is a due process question, not just in the legal sense of 
compliance with the requirements of the fifth and fourteenth 
amendments, but in the popular sense of action which is consist-
ent with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice which 
undergird a free society. Private though an arbitration tribunal 
may be, the parties who appear before it have the right to expect 
that its procedures and processes will conform to fundamental 
standards of fairness which would be required in the case of gov-
ernments. Paraphrasing a famous line from Daniel Webster, we 
can say: "In a tribunal like this, entirely popular, care should be 
taken in every part of the system, not only to do right, but to sat-
isfy the community that right is done.''5 
THE USES OF p AST MISCONDUCT 
In discipline and discharge cases, companies typically offer the 
record of previous derelictions on the part of the employee. In 
part this is because they have learned from personnel experts6 and 
arbitrators7 that progressive discipline is deemed desirable. In 
any event, the problem takes many forms. Does it make any dif-
ference, for instance, whether the company is using the past rec-
ord to: (1) prove that the penalty which has been imposed is ap-
propriate; (2) suggest the likelihood that the employee committed 
a 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 4, at 27 (3d ed. 1940) • 
4 Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REv. 999, 
1017 (1955). 
5 THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF DANIEL "WEBSTER 163 (1903) • "In a government like 
ours, entirely popular, care should be taken in every part of the system, not only to do 
right, but to satisfy the community that right is done." 
6 PIGORS &: MYERS, PERSONNEL .ADMINISTRATION 202 (1947). 
7 Mueller Brass Co., 3 Lab. Arb. 271 (1946) • · 
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the present offense; or (3) undermine the credibility of the em-
ployee as a witness? The courts, in criminal cases, have certainly 
thought there was a difference. Former convictions are clearly 
relevant in connection with the degree of penalty.8 But if the evi-
dence of past misconduct is offered for the purpose of proving the 
likelihood that the present offense has been committed, there is 
what appears at first glance to be a flat rule against admission. 
Thus, "the doing of one act is in itself no evidence that the same 
or a like act was again done by the same person," and "where the 
doing of an act is the proposition to be proved, there can never be 
a direct inference from an act of former conduct to the act 
charged."9 There are, however, numerous exceptions to this 
rule.10 And it would be unrealistic to distinguish between "prov-
ing likelihood" and "degree of penalty" when discussing the ad-
missibility of past misconduct in arbitration proceedings because 
of two fundamental differences between the arbitrator and the 
judge. The first is that the arbitrator sits in review of a penalty 
which has already been imposed by the company, while the judge 
has the duty of setting the penalty. Secondly, the judge normally 
assesses the penalty after the jury has decided the question of guilt 
or innocence, whereas the arbitrator is both judge and jury. It is 
impractical for the arbitrator to hear the evidence, decide whether 
an employee deserves to be penalized, and then return to hear evi-
dence of past misconduct which might bear on the degree of pen-
alty. In this connection it may be worth noting that state statutes 
which permit the jury to fix a criminal sentence and allow the fact 
of prior convictions to be considered by jurors before verdict have 
been severely criticized,11 although not held unconstitutional.12 
Past misconduct may, of course, be offered in quite different 
contexts. Contrast the case in which the company offers the record 
of the past year showing progressive steps taken to correct absen-
teeism with the case in which it shows an admittedly bad absen-
teeism record five years before followed by an intervening period 
of satisfactory attendance. Consider also the case in which the em-
ployer wishes to show the record of the employee with his previ-
ous employer. Except for the last case, involving the previous em-
s 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 81, at 511 (3d ed. 1940) . 
9 Id. § 192, at 641-42. 
10 McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 60, at 137 (1954) • 
11 United States v. Price, 258 F.2d 918 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S., 922 (1958) . 
12 Ibid. 
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ployer, arbitrators will almost certainly admit the evidence, 
although the "stale" absenteeism record may be given little weight. 
There is a split among arbitrators with respect to the case involv-
ing the previous employer. The company may well have known of 
the employee's record when it hired him, and thus condoned it; 
and there is more reason to believe that the evidence is being of-
fered simply to prejudice the arbitrator against the individual. 
Nevertheless, some arbitrators feel that it is better to admit the 
evidence and weigh its credibility than to exclude it. 
Instances in which the company offers an employee's past rec-
ord for the purpose of suggesting the likelihood that he has com-
mitted the present offense are much more difficult to deal with. 
Typical examples are the following: 
I. A bus driver is disciplined for negligent driving. He denies 
the charge, and the company offers to show that the driver has had 
three accidents of a similar nature during the past year and must 
now be considered "accident prone." 
2. An employee is disciplined for drinking, gambling, or pil-
ferage on the job. He denies the charge, and the company wishes 
to show that he was· given a disciplinary layoff for the same reason 
during the past year, and had been warned on two other occasions. 
3. The same basic facts as in examples one and two, except 
that the previous offenses occurred while employed by a previous 
employer, or were offenses against the civil or criminal law (e.g., 
fined for being drunk and disorderly). 
In all such cases there will be independent, but probably in-
conclusive, evidence that the employee has committed the present 
offense. The clear purpose of the past record is to suggest to the 
arbitrator the likelihood that an employee with such a past record 
has, in fact, committed the present offense. When questioned as 
to how they handle such evidence, arbitrators display a lack of 
uniformity. A large majority will admit the evidence and give it 
weight when the present offense has a functional relationship to 
the past offense: e.g., the "accident prone" driver. But only a 
minority appear to be willing to receive evidence of past offenses 
insofar as this bears upon a currently alleged, but functionally un-
related, offense. There is also a much greater willingness to admit 
evidence of past misconduct with the present employer than with 
either a predecessor employer or against the public order. 
Finally, there is the situation in which an attempt is made to 
introduce the past record for the purpose of undermining the 
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credibility of the witness. Three examples will make this type of 
problem clearer: 
I. The contract requires that overtime be distributed equally. 
The company alleges that X was called at home when it was his 
turn, but that he did not answer. X insists that he was at home 
and did not receive such a call. The company then seeks to show 
that X has entered a similar claim in the past but that the griev-
ance committee has never seen fit to process it beyond the first 
step. The implication, of course, is that not even his brethren 
believe X. 
2. An employee is discharged for stealing, but he denies the 
charge. The evidence is wholly circumstantial, and the company 
wants to show that the employee has a record of criminal convic-
tions for stealing despite the entry of pleas of not guilty in each 
case. 
3. The employee is disciplined for sleeping-a charge which 
he denies. The contract contains a clause prohibiting introduction 
of an employee's past record, but the company wants to show that 
the employee has been disciplined in the past for this reason and 
has always denied the charge. The company insists that such a 
showing will not be contrary to the contractual clause because it 
is being offered only to attack the credibility of the witness. 
Most arbitrators will have little trouble with the overtime 
case, although they may feel that there are better ways of proving 
whether the telephone call was, in fact, made. Proof of prior 
criminal convictions will find arbitrators split, some feeling that 
any record outside the plant is irrelevant, but others admitting 
the evidence and giving it weight. The sleeping case, which comes 
under a contract barring evidence of past misconduct, will almost 
certainly find the evidence being rejected on the ground that the 
offer is simply being made in a way which circumvents the con-
tract. 
In discussing the law of criminal procedure, Wigmore has sug-
gested that there are at least four reasons why information with 
respect to past misconduct should not be permitted to reach the 
judge or jury prior to a decision on the question of guilt. They 
are: (1) the tendency to find the defendant guilty simply because 
he is a likely person to do such acts; (2) the tendency to condemn 
for past unpunished offenses even though the defendant may not 
be guilty of the present charge; (3) the injustice of forcing one to 
defend himself against unexpected evidence or evidence which he 
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will find it hard to combat; and (4) the possible confusion of new 
issues which will inevitably result.13 Arbitrators express concern 
over substantially the same problems in cases which come before 
them. How, then, should they rule when such questions arise? If 
the criminal cases may be taken as a proper analogy, it would not 
be inconsistent with legal due process to admit the evidence. There-
fore, in the last analysis, the rule which is adopted in arbitration 
would seem to depend on the answer to the following question: 
At what point does the prejudice likely to result from the receipt 
of evidence of past misconduct outweigh the common-sense rele-
vance of such information? And once that question is answered, a 
second question arises: If the evidence of past misconduct is ad-
mitted, what weight should be given to it? 
Such questions do not lend themselves to firm and unalterable 
answers. However, it would seem that the arbitrator would be 
justified in holding to the following guidelines: 
I. Unless the grievant has already put in evidence of his good 
character, evidence of his past offenses should not be received 
until the record contains more than a pro forma showing with re-
spect to the offenses charged. 
2. When evidence of past misconduct is offered for the pur-
pose of inferring that the grievant committed the present offense 
it should be admitted, provided it is of record and known to the 
grievant. Such evidence should, however, be given weight only 
insofar as there is a clear relationship between the kinds of offenses 
involved, and insofar as the events have taken place within a rea-
sonable span of time. (Example: Repeated absenteeism proves 
nothing with respect to a charge of stealing, but repeated accidents 
may suggest that the driver is "accident prone."14) 
3. When evidence of past misconduct is offered for the pur-
pose of impeaching the credibility of the grievant it should be re-
ceived, provided it does not appear to be offered simply to preju-
dice the arbitrator. 
4. When evidence of past misconduct is offered in order to 
justify the severity of the present penalty it should normally be 
received. The weight to be given such evidence will then depend 
upon: (a) the relationship between the kinds of offenses, and (b) 
the period of time involved. This rule should apply to past con-
13 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 194, at 650-51 (3d ed. 1940) • 
14 James &: Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident Law, 63 HARv. L. REv. 769 
(1950). 
1961] EVIDENCE AND THE LABOR ARBITRATOR 139 
duct both within and without the company although in general 
the latter evidence will carry less weight. (Example: A company 
hires a known alcoholic at the request of Alcoholics Anonymous. 
The man comes to work drunk and the company imposes disci-
pline. Surely it is relevant, in terms of the leniency which can be 
expected from the company, that the man is a known alcoholic. 
To hold otherwise would be to discourage companies from the 
socially-desirable policy of cooperating with rehabilitation agen-
cies.) 
5. A contractual limitation on the use of the past record 
should be broadly construed to exclude such evidence. 
AccESS TO INFORMATION IN THE FILES OF THE OTHER p ARTY 
The grievance procedure gives rise to at least two types of 
situations in which one party desires information which is in the 
hands of the other. In the first case the information is sought for 
its own sake. Thus if A contends that he has not shared equally 
in the distribution of overtime, although the contract so requires, 
the union needs the records showing how the overtime has been 
distributed. Similarly, if B contends that his seniority is greater 
than that of C, the union needs to know what the company records 
show in this respect. In the other type of case, however, the in-
formation is expected to serve a collateral purpose. Thus if X is . 
fired for excessive absenteeism, the union may want to see the 
records of a number of other employees whom it knows have been 
guilty of absenteeism in order to see how their lost time compares 
with that of X. Or if Y is the senior man and he is denied a pro-
motion on the ground that his education is inadequate, the union 
may want to compare the educational qualifications of other men 
now on the higher job. 
In the run-of-the-mill case the company and the union readily 
exchange information in grievance cases, both because they rec-
ognize that this will contribute to the fair and equitable settle-
ment of the case, and because they want to avoid the cost of arbi-
tration. The essence of the dispute may revolve around a given 
fact: e.g., who has the greater seniority. There would obviously 
be no point in hiding the seniority record in such a case. Never-
theless, there are situations in which one party declines to make 
available to the other information which it possesses and which is 
deemed by the other to be relevant to its position. The following 
two examples will illustrate the point: 
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1. A tugboat almost sinks from water which has entered the 
hold. The company attorney immediately interviews all crew 
members and obtains lengthy statements from them. Thereafter, 
the chief engineer is discharged for gross negligence. In trying to 
decide whether to take the grievance to arbitration, the union 
representative interviews all the crew members. In the process he 
becomes aware that all of them have already been interviewed by 
the company's attorney. Before making a decision as to whether 
to go to arbitration he would like to see these statements so that 
he will know how reliable the various witnesses are. He requests 
the company to let him see the transcript of such interviews, but 
the request is denied. What, if anything, can he do about this? If 
he goes to arbitration without seeing the transcripts, but then asks 
for them after the attorney for the company has completed exam-
ining the witness, may he then have them? 
2. Production and management personnel are both covered 
by one master insurance contract, although the benefits for man-
agement personnel are higher. Individual employees receive cer-
tificates of insurance, and a statement in the collective bargaining 
contract specifies the amounts of their coverage, but neither the 
employee nor the union has access to the master contract. X then 
dies under circumstances which raise a question of whether he was 
entitled to the old or amended benefits, and the company insists 
that under the terms of the master contract he gets only the old 
benefits. The union then asks to see the master contract, and the 
company offers to have it photostated except for the provision 
showing management benefits. This the union refuses, contend-
ing that it is entitled to see the original master contract. What, 
if anything, can the union do about this? And if the case goes to 
arbitration should the arbitrator insist that the company put in 
evidence the complete master contract? 
Faced with a similar problem in the civil courts, counsel might 
attempt, through use of the discovery procedure outlined in rules 
26 to 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to obtain the 
information desired. But the arbitrator has no power to order 
discovery; and in the ad hoc cases there would not, in fact, even be 
an arbitrator at this stage. In lieu of discovery an action might be 
brought under the Taft-Hartley Act, contending that the reluct-
ant party was refusing to bargain collectively by withholding the 
information. It is clear, of course, that good-faith bargaining re-
quires that the company furnish the union with information 
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which will enable it to police the collective bargaining contract.15 
But this will be a time-consuming procedure, and may be of little 
value to the union in deciding whether it wishes to take the griev-
ance to arbitration. What, then, can be done? Assuming the un-
fair labor practice proceeding is not used, the answer seems to be 
that little can be done short of arbitration. If this is so, what can 
be expected when the question reaches the arbitration level? 
If we revert to the tugboat case, an issue as to the availability 
of the transcript of early company interviews with the crew mem-
bers is likely to be made at the time any such witnesses are 
examined. And if counsel is present for the union, he is almost cer-
tain to mention the Jencks case16 and to contend that it is appli-
cable. That controversial case, it will be rememberd, involved a 
prosecution for filing a false non-communist affidavit with the 
National Labor Relations Board. At the trial two important prose-
cution witnesses admitted making prior reports to the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation. The defense then requested the trial 
court to examine those reports and tum over to the defense any 
portions found inconsistent with the answers given by the witnesses 
at the trial. The denial of the request, subsequently affirmed by 
the Fifth Circuit, 17 was based on the theory that prior to produc-
tion the defense must establish a variance between the testimony 
and the documents. The Supreme Court reversed on the ground 
that the defense could hardly know that there was an inconsistency 
between the testimony and the document without seeing the latter, 
and stated that the defendant need only show that the material 
sought related to the testimony. The Court also said that the 
defense must have access to all relevant documents irrespective 
of their admissibility in evidence, and disapproved any necessity 
for an initial testing of admissibility by the trial judge. 
Jencks was, of course, a criminal trial. When counsel for a 
company argued before the NLRB that the Jencks ruling re-
quired the Board to give the company access to the Board's file 
data in an unfair labor practice proceeding, although the Board's 
rules forbade any such disclosure, the request was turned down 
with the statement that the Jencks rule applied only to criminal 
lo C/. NLRB v. Whitin Mach. Works, 217 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 
349 U.S. 905 (1955). 
16 Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). 
17 Jencks v. United States, 226 F.2d 540 and 553 (5th Cir. 1955). 
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cases and not to proceedings before an administrative board.18 But 
shortly thereafter, in Adhesive Products Corp., another Board 
ruling to the same effect came to the Second Circuit and was re-
versed.19 In that case Adhesive was being charged with failure 
to bargain, and in the course of the proceeding before a trial 
examiner a union organizer used a non-confidential written state-
ment made to Board officials for purposes of refreshing his mem-
ory before taking the witness stand. The company asked the ex-
aminer to order the witness to turn over the statement for use in 
impeaching him on cross-examination and the examiner refused 
to so rule. On review, the court brushed off the fact that Jencks 
was a criminal trial, and expressed the view that there was no sig-
nificant distinction between civil and criminal proceedings in this 
regard. Said the court: 
"Accordingly, these rules set forth in the Jencks decision pro-
vide an a fortiori basis for holding that the statement de-
manded in the case at bar should have been produced and 
made available for respondent's inspection if they are appli-
cable to civil proceedings, such as administrative hearings, as 
well as to criminal trials. In our opinion, logic compels the 
conclusion that these rules are applicable to an administra-
tive hearing . . . . The production and inspection, and pos-
sible use for cross-examination purposes, of such a document 
could serve only to test the memory and credibility of the 
witness, while, in the absence of a claim of confidence or priv-
ilege, there can be no sound reason to bar such production. 
The request in the case at bar was not a mere fishing expedi-
tion, but rather concerned the credibility of the most impor-
tant witness who testified in support of the charges."20 
Jencks represented an exercise of the Supreme Court's power 
to prescribe procedures for the administration of justice in the 
federal courts. It was not decided on constitutional grounds, 
although, as Mr. Justice Brennan later said, "[I]t would be idle to 
say that the commands of the Constitution were not close to the 
surface of the decision .... "21 
If an arbitrator, in the tugboat case, denies the union access to 
18 Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 1280 (1957) • 
19 NLRB v. Adhesive Prods. Corp., 258 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1958); accord, NLRB v. 
Capitol Fish Co., - F.2d - (5th Cir. 1961); Schauffier v. Local 107, Teamsters' Union, 
196 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Pa. 1960). 
20 NLRB v. Adhesive Prods. Corp., supra note 19, at 408. 
21 Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 362-63 (1959). 
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the earlier statements of the witnesses he will probably not be 
guilty of denying the grievant due process of law in the legal sense 
-although it may not be beyond the bounds of reason to suppose 
that at some future date, in a proceeding to enforce an arbitration 
award, a grievant who had been denied access to such a statement 
would be held to have been deprived of due process of law. But 
the principle of Jencks is as sound for the arbitrator as for the 
administrative agency. The request is not a mere fishing expedi-
tion. It does concern the credibility of an important witness and 
should be produced. 
The question of the master insurance policy raises a somewhat 
different issue. Here the company claims that the union is on a 
fishing expedition, for the question of the level of benefits for 
management personnel is not relevant to the issue of whether X is 
entitled to the new or old level of benefits. What is unsatisfactory 
about having the arbitrator examine the master contract to satisfy 
himself that the photostat is an exact copy except for the irrelevant 
clause showing management benefits? How can the union possibly 
be prejudiced by this? This is the exact procedure which Congress 
provided for in a statute22 enacted to narrow the effect of the 
Jencks decision.23 
Since the arbitrator is usually without the power of subpoena 
he will not be able to force production of the documents in either 
the tugboat or the insurance policy cases. But this is not a serious 
handicap-as is evidenced by the fact that the proposed United 
States Arbitration Act, drafted by a committee of the National 
Academy of Arbitrators, does not even include such a provision. 
Neither side is inclined to withhold a genuinely relevant docu-
ment because to do so invites an adverse ruling arising partly out 
of the arbitrator's inference that the document is damaging to the 
party withholding it. 
There is doubtless a considerable temptation in arbitration 
proceedings to embark on "fishing" expeditions. Even so, the ex-
perienced arbitrator will have little difficulty dealing with such 
22 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1958) • That statute was upheld in Palermo v. United States, 
supra note 21. 
23 The statute applies only to criminal prosecutions and provides, inter alia, that 
no report in the possession of the United States shall be subject to subpoena or discovery 
until after a witness has testified, and if the United States claims that part of the material 
docs not relate to the matter at hand, the court must inspect the statement in camera 
and excise irrelevant portions. 
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cases. For the rest of the cases, would not the following guidelines 
adequately serve the purpose? 
1. In the absence of any showing of prejudice, relevant infor-
mation in the hands of one party should be made available to the 
other party in an arbitration proceeding at the request of the 
arbitrator. 
2. In the event the party to whom such a request is made re-
fuses to honor it, and in the absence of a subpoena power in the 
hands of the arbitrator, an inference may be drawn against the 
party refusing to produce the evidence. 
3. In a ] encks-type case, the principle involved in that case 
should be followed. 
4. The arbitrator should, on request of a party, excise irrele-
vant portions of a document after privately inspecting it. 
CONFRONTATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION 
Problems of confrontation and cross-examination are partic-
ularly troublesome in the labor arbitration field because there is 
likely to be a square conflict between the informality of the hear-
ing and certain industrial relations policy considerations, on the 
one hand, and some very sensitive personal rights and funda-
mental considerations of fairness, on the other. Some examples 
will make the point clearer. 
Retail stores, public utilities, and other similar businesses, 
have a problem of customer relations. A customer in a super-
market may, for instance, complain that a certain checker is con-
sistently overcharging him. Yet he may be unwilling to make any 
formal statement, and be even less willing to appear as a witness 
against the checker if disciplinary measures are taken by the com-
pany and then brought to arbitration. Or a female customer may 
complain that a utility service man has made improper advances 
to her in the course of a service call. Yet she may be unwilling to 
discuss the issue in more than general terms, or appear as a wit-
ness at an arbitration hearing if the company takes disciplinary 
action. 
Another line of cases involves the peculiar problems of certain 
businesses in which the honesty and integrity of employees can be 
checked only by the use of "spotters" who, while playing the role of 
customers, actually watch for any irregularities. Retail stores and 
bus companies frequently employ such assistance. Usually it is 
supplied by established firms which furnish trained agents who 
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make routine checks. To remain useful these agents must be 
anonymous. Their reports may identify irregularities on the part 
of a bus driver in dealing with fares, or on the part of a retail cash-
ier or salesman. The employee is then confronted with the evi-
dence, but given no opportunity to talk to the person from whom 
it came. And if a grievance results from disciplinary action the 
arbitrator finds himself presented with the question of receiving 
evidence from an unidentified source and without the right of 
confrontation or cross-examination. 
There are other kinds of cases, some of them more common 
than either of the above examples. A substantial number of griev-
ances involve situations in which the result hinges on the word of 
one management man versus one union man-but there is an-
other employee, who is also a union member, who could testify. 
If, for instance, X is discharged for hitting his foreman, X may 
claim that he thought the foreman was about to hit him with a 
piece of steel. The foreman may deny that he had anything in his 
hand, or was in any way threatening X. Y, working at a nearby 
machine, may have seen the whole incident. Suppose, in fact, that 
after X struck the foreman Y rushed over and said to the admit-
tedly hot-tempered X, "Are you crazy? What did you want to hit 
him for?" If and when the case comes to arbitration the company 
may not wish to call Y. Many companies simply refuse to call one 
production employee against another. They know that this puts 
him in an impossible position, for Y is then not only a "squealer," 
which our mores condemn, but is guilty of treason against a fellow 
union member as well. The latter can result in disciplinary ac-
tion. The fact remains that the arbitrator's job would be much 
easier if he knew what Y had to say. Should he insist that Y be 
called? Suppose Y refuses to testify? In the absence of Y, suppose 
the foreman wants to repeat Y's remark after X hit the foreman? 
Should this be permitted? Suppose the union objects? 
In trying to decide how arbitrators should deal with cases of 
this kind, it is useful to check the court analogy. In the courts the 
confrontation requirement has always been considered to have two 
purposes, only one of which was essential. The first, and critical, 
purpose is to permit cross-examination. Of secondary importance 
is the opportunity to scrutinize the witness while testifying in 
order to get some feel for the truth or falsity of what he is saying. 
Thus, the second requirement can be dispensed with where the 
witness has testified at a previous hearing and been under cross-
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examination, and is not now available for a reason such as absence 
from the state, death, illness, etc.24 
The principle of confrontation is given constitutional protec-
tion under the federal constitution, and in practically every state, 
in criminal cases. Wigmore has pointed out that there is a con-
siderable carry-over into the civil law.25 
Perhaps the most interesting analogy in the courts to the kind 
of cases which arise in arbitration involves the government's dis-
missal of employees for security reasons. Such dismissals have dis-
turbed the courts, and indeed the nation, because of the inherent 
unfairness in depriving a citizen of his job and his reputation 
without an opportunity to know his accusers, to confront them, 
and to cross-examine them.26 Counsel for government employees 
in such cases have long argued that the individuals were being 
deprived of due process. In the only case which has squarely pre-
sented the point the Supreme Court divided four to four, thereby 
leaving undisturbed a court of appeals case in which the court 
held that due process had not been denied. Said the court: "Due 
process of law is not applicable unless one is being deprived of 
something to which he has a right."27 And since executive offices 
are held at the will of the appointing authority, the court thought 
there could be no such right. 
Despite the above opinion, the Supreme Court has expressed 
concern about the absence of confrontation and cross-examination 
in two more recent cases involving security dismissals. In Vitarelli 
v. Seaton,28 the Department of Interior had established a proce-
dure for considering cases of dismissal for security reasons, and 
then failed to follow its own procedure. One of the deficiencies 
was that the dismissed employee was not given a chance to cross-
examine one of his identified accusers. In an opinion which con-
curred in part and dissented in part, Mr. Justice Frankfurter 
made these significant comments: 
"An executive agency must be rigorously held to the stand-
ards by which it professes its action to be judged. . . . Ac-
cordingly, if dismissal from employment is based on a defined 
24 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1395 (3d ed. 1940) • 
25 Id. § 1400, at 144. 
26 Arnold, The American Ideal of a Fair Trial, 9 ARK. L. REv. 311 (1955). 
27 Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1950), afj'd per curiam, 341 U.S. 
918 (1951). 
28 359 U.S. 535 (1959). 
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procedure, even though generous beyond the requirements 
that bind such agency, that procedure must be scrupulously 
observed. . . . He that takes the procedural sword shall perish 
with that sword. 
"The Secretary of the Interior concededly had untrammeled 
right to dismiss Vitarelli out of hand, since he had no pro-
tected employment rights. He could do so as freely as a 
private employer ·who is not bound by procedural restric-
tions of a collective bargaining contract."29 
In the other case, Green v. McElroy,30 the Supreme Court re-
versed an administrative decision which had resulted in a denial 
of clearance to an executive of a company doing business with 
the Navy, on the ground that neither Congress nor the President 
had authorized the procedures whereby the security clearance 
had been denied. The opinion contained language which caused 
Mr. Justice Clark to comment: "While the Court disclaims decid-
ing this constitutional question [due process], no one reading the 
opinion will doubt that the explicit language of its broad sweep 
speaks in prophecy."31 Particularly disturbing was the portion of 
the majority opinion which stated: "[T]he right to hold specific 
private employment and to follow a chosen profession free from • 
unreasonable governmental interference comes within the 'lib-
erty' and 'property' concepts of the Fifth Amendment . . . ."32 
This proposition, thought Mr. Justice Clark, was clearly errone-
ous and unsupported by past cases.33 
The thing which stands out about labor arbitration, in the 
kind of cases under discussion, is the amount of experimentation 
and horse-sense procedure which are used. 
To be specific, hearsay is almost universally accepted in 
preference to calling one production employee against another. 
The arbitrator's reasoning is fairly simple. Such a witness is, un-
questionably, in an extremely difficult position-so difficult, in 
fact, that he may not be very reliable. And the reason for this 
runs deeper than just possible union discipline. No one likes a 
"squealer"-this is as basic to the growing child as the acquisition 
of his ABC's. Hearsay may be equally unreliable, but when it is 
29 Id. at 546-47. 
30 360 U.S. 474 (1959). 
31 Id. at 524. 
32 Id. at 492. 
33 Id. at 512-13. 
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received the party against whom it weighs, usually the union, can 
decide that it is better to produce the reluctant employee and 
encourage him to testify. To go back to the earlier example, most 
arbitrators will permit the foreman to say that when X hit him, 
Y grabbed X and said, "Are you crazy? What did you want to hit 
him for?" The union can always call Y to deny that he said this. 
If it doesn't, common sense suggests that Y probably did make the 
remark. And it has some weight in deciding the credibility of X 
in saying that he hit the foreman only when the latter came 
after him with a piece of steel in his hand. One arbitrator, much 
respected nationally, goes as far as to refuse to let one production 
employee testify against another. But at the same time he allows 
almost unlimited hearsay as to what the employee might say if 
called. Another distinguished arbitrator deplores the tradition 
of not calling bargaining unit witnesses.34 
"Private" investigations, conducted by the arbitrator, are not 
infrequently authorized. Take the case of the female who com-
plains that the utility's service man made improper advances to 
her. Its own investigation may convince the company that the 
customer is telling the truth so it fires the employee. But when 
the arbitration comes along she refuses to testify. The arbitrator 
may be, and usually is, without the power of subpoena. The 
union, in recognition of the problem, may be willing to authorize 
the arbitrator to visit the complaining customer and interview 
her. He may then decide the case based upon conclusions reached 
as a result of the interview. 
In transit cases the collective bargaining contract sometimes 
gives formal recognition to the "private" witness. Thus article 
2 (g) of the 1953 agreement between the Philadelphia Trans-
portation Company and the Transport Workers Union of Ameri-
ca, Local 234, reads: "In case any testimony by a secret investi-
gator of the Company is offered it shall be given only before the 
Chairman with no one else present and such a witness shall be 
referred to only by number so that this identity shall not be 
disclosed." 
Another variation that has been worked out in at least one 
grocery chain calls for the acceptance, at the hearing, of customer 
complaints based upon company records, but then provides the 
Si Wirtz, Due Process of Arbitration, in NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, THE 
Alu!ITRATORS AND THE PARTIES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTII ANNUAL MEETING l, 18 
(McKelvey ed. 1958) • 
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union an opportunity to check privately with the customer. If 
discrepancies appear the arbitrator is then authorized (the sub-
poena power being there available) to call the customer. 
Most difficult of all, perhaps, are the rare cases in which, dur-
ing a recess, both counsel suggest to the arbitrator that they think 
a given witness was not telling the truth, counsel also suggesting 
that the arbitrator have a private chat with the witness after-
wards to see if he can come any nearer to the truth. 
Many arbitrators are unwilling, even with the consent of the 
parties, to talk privately with a witness if the decision is to be 
influenced by the results of the conference. Even when the con-
tract authorizes the arbitrator to make such investigations as he 
thinks proper, the propriety of private interrogation may be chal-
lenged as it was under the General Motors agreement.35 In some 
cases, as a sort of compromise, arbitrators have agreed to talk 
privately with witnesses provided they can then report back to 
both parties the substance of the information obtained. In a 
transit "spotter" case, one arbitrator overcame the problem of 
the anonymous witness by placing him behind a screen where he 
could be seen only by the arbitrator and counsel for both sides 
while he was testifying. 
It is quite obvious that in this area arbitrators depart drasti-
cally from the common-law rules of evidence known to the courts. 
In doing so are they violating fundamental considerations of 
fairness which are essential to due process of law? By taking hear-
say in preference to an available witness it is difficult to see that 
a serious due process question is involved. In practically all cases 
this procedure is accepted or condoned by the parties. 
Private investigations offer more difficulty. Surely it can be 
agreed that they should never be undertaken without the consent 
of the parties. Even then, one may question whether the indi-
vidual will be bound by the action of his union in agreeing to 
such a procedure. Communicating the results of the investigation 
back to the parties before decision seems preferable to no such 
report. 
In the spotter cases it does not necessarily follow that because, 
as one arbitrator said, "The System may be odious, but there is 
35 Alexander, Impartial Umpireships: General Motors-UAJV Experience, in NA• 
noNAL ACADEMY OF .ARBI'IRATORS, ARBrraATION AND THE LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
TWELFTH ANNUAL MEE'I'lNG 108, 121 (McKelvey ed. 1959) • 
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no practical alternative,"36 confrontation and cross-examination 
cannot be provided. It may be that spotters must be utilized, but 
there are ways of insuring the parties an opportunity to cross-
examine without revealing the identity of the witness or expos-
ing him. 
Perhaps it is possible to summarize what seem to be desirable 
rules as follows: 
· I. Depositions and former testimony of witnesses should be 
accepted where such witnesses are now unavailable. 
2. When the alternatives are hearsay evidence versus one em-
ployee testifying against another, the choice should ordinarily 
lie with the parties. If the witness is available, but either is not 
called or declines to testify, hearsay evidence should be received 
in place of his testimony. 
3. Private investigations by the arbitrator should be held to 
a minimum and conducted only with the authorization of the 
parties. Where possible, arrangements should be made to report 
back to the parties on the investigation before the arbitrator 
makes a final decision. 
4. Where the nature of the business requires that witnesses 
remain anonymous, arrangements should nevertheless be made to 
permit counsel for the parties to confront and examine them in 
the presence of the arbitrator. 
THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 
We know, of course, that under the federal and many state 
constitutions no man "shall be compelled in any criminal case to 
be a witness against himself."37 And we know that despite the 
language which purports to limit the privilege to criminal cases, 
the courts have held that "the privilege of a witness not to answer 
incriminating questions extends to all judicial or official hear-
ings, investigations or inquiries where persons are called upon 
formally to give testimony."38 But in order to assess the role, if 
any, which the privilege should play in arbitration proceedings, 
one needs to be aware of two or three other facets of the privilege 
as applied in the courts. 
In the first place, it is only when a person has been formally 
36 Los Angeles Transit Lines, 25 Lab. Arb. 740, 741 (1955) • 
37 U.S. CoNsr. amend. V. 
38 McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 123 (1954) • 
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accused or officially suspected of crime that he may not be ques-
tioned at all. In all other situations the witness must answer 
non-incriminating questions and must claim his privilege when 
the question is incriminating.39 Secondly, many courts have held 
that the privilege extends only to testimonial compulsion. Thus 
the privilege is not breached if the accused is fingerprinted, photo-
graphed, deprived of his papers and other objects in his posses-
sion, physically examined, required to submit to blood or other 
bodily fluid exams, required to give a specimen of his handwrit-
ing, etc.4° Finally, the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment is not violated by a state law which permits the prosecuting 
attorney to comment on the failure of the defendant to take the 
stand.41 Mr. Justice Cardozo once addressed himself to this point 
in the following language: 
"This too [ compulsory self-incrimination] might be lost, and 
justice still be done. Indeed, today as in the past there are 
students of our penal system who look upon the immunity 
as a mischief rather than a benefit, and who would limit its 
scope, or destroy it altogether. No doubt there would remain 
the need to give protection against torture, physical or men-
tal. . . . Justice, however, would not perish if the accused 
were subject to a duty to respond to orderly inquiry."42 
In the purely private world of labor arbitration the consti-
tutional protection against self-incrimination presumably has 
little application except insofar as it may be a desirable principle 
in the interest of a fair procedure. In that connection one ought 
to note at the outset that the proportions of the problem are al-
most certain to be different before the arbitrator than in the court. 
There are two reasons for this. The first is that the question of 
the privilege usually arises in a collateral, rather than direct, 
way in arbitration. And the second is that since the arbitrator 
usually has neither the power of subpoena nor the power to hold 
a party in contempt, the question is not really one of compelling 
someone to testify, but rather of whether it is permissible to draw 
an inference against him because he has not testified. To see the 
problem a little more clearly, let us examine some of the kinds of 
cases which arise in arbitration. 
ao Id. at 288. 
40 Id. at 264. 
41 Twining v. New Jersey, 2II U.S. 78 (1908). 
42 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325·26 (1937) • 
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Post-war ideological differences, which have given a new em-
phasis to security measures, account for a number of cases. Em-
ployees have frequently been called before legislative committees 
and asked about their affiliation with subversive organizations. 
On a number of occasions they have refused to testify, claiming 
the privilege of the fifth amendment. The employer might then 
discharge the individual on the ground that he is a security risk. 
If the employee protests he may be entitled to take the case to 
arbitration-thereby, on occasion, posing a difficult internal prob-
lem for the union.43 After a certain amount of struggle, arbitra-
tors now quite uniformly hold that the employee must be rein-
stated where the sole cause for the discharge is the individual's 
unwillingness to testify.44 In reaching this conclusion much em-
phasis has been placed upon Supreme Court decisions, particu-
larly Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ.45 That case involved a 
situation in which the New York City Charter provided that when 
a city employee utilized the privilege against self-incrimination to 
avoid answering a question relating to his official conduct be-
fore a legislative committee his employment would terminate. 
Slochower was a teacher in one of the city colleges. He was dis-
charged without notice or a hearing when he invoked the fifth 
amendment before a federal legislative committee with respect 
to his membership in the Communist Party. The court held that 
the summary dismissal of Slochower violated the requirements of 
due process of law. In his opinion Mr. Justice Clark said: "The 
privilege against self-incrimination would be reduced to a hollow 
mockery if its exercise could be taken as equivalent either to a 
confession of guilt or a conclusive presumption of perjury."46 
But Slochower was followed by Beilan v. Board of Pub. Educ.,41 
in which, by a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court held that 
it did not constitute a violation of due process under the four-
teenth amendment to discharge a public school teacher for failure 
to cooperate by refusing to answer questions of supervisors con-
cerning membership in subversive organizations. Although the 
employee had based his position on the privilege against self-
43 Ostrofsky v. United Steelworkers, 171 F. Supp. 782 (D. Md. 1959). 
44 R.C.A. Communications, Inc., 29 Lab. Arb. 567 (1957) ; Pratt & Whitney Co., 
28 Lab. Arb. 668 (1957); J. H. Day Co., 22 Lab. Arb. 751 (1954); United Press Ass'n, 
22 Lab. Arb. 679 (1954) • 
45 350 U.S. 551 (1956). 
46 Id. at 557. 
47 357 U.S. 399 (1958). 
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incrimination, the Court said this was irrelevant since he was dis-
charged not for claiming the privilege, but for refusing to 
cooperate. 
Beilan, like Slochower, has found its parallel in arbitration 
decisions. Thus an arbitrator held that a newspaper did not have 
to retain editorial writers who invoked the fifth amendment.48 
And other arbitrators have held that if the plant is engaged in 
defense work,40 or there is unrest in the plant,50 the discharge of 
an employee who invokes the fifth amendment may be justified. 
There is, it should be added, another decision reinstating an in-
dividual discharged because of the alleged unrest when manage-
ment made no effort to control the unrest.51 
Aside from the security cases, arbitrators find themselves faced 
with occasional cases in which the plant offense gives rise both to 
disciplinary action and a criminal charge. When this happens the 
two proceedings will seldom proceed simultaneously. The result 
is that either the criminal trial or the arbitration may have been 
concluded and a decision announced before the other tribunal 
acts. In one such case52 an employee was indicted for allegedly 
stealing tires from his employer's plant. He was suspended pend-
ing trial, in the course of which he was acquitted after claiming 
his privilege against self-incrimination. When the arbitration 
began, involving the man's discharge for the same offense, the 
grievant once again refused to testify. The arbitrator upheld the 
discharge on the ground that by refusing to explain his admitted 
possession of the tires, the employee had failed to satisfy his obli-
gation to his employer to cooperate in stopping thievery from the 
plant. 
In a reverse situation53 the grievant refused to testify on the 
ground that his criminal trial was pending, and that the arbitra-
tion record could be subpoenaed for that proceeding. The arbi-
trator thought the refusal was justified in such a case, and ought 
not to be used against the grievant. In discussions of this case 
many other arbitrators have indicated that they agree with the 
ruling. It is, in a sense, inconsistent with the majority of the 
court cases which have held that a witness may not refuse to 
48 Los Angeles Daily News, 19 Lab. Arb. 39 (1952) • 
40 Bethlehem Steel Co., 24 Lab. Arb. 852 (1955). 
110 Burt Mfg. Co., 21 Lab. Arb. 532 (1953) . 
111 Republic Steel Corp., 28 Lab. Arb. 810 (1957) • 
112 Wirtz, supra note 34, at 20. 
113 New York Times Co., 29 Lab. Arb. 442 (1957). 
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testify on the ground that his answers may subject him to prosecu-
tion in another forum. 54 
All of the above examples involve situations in which dual 
proceedings account for the difficulties in connection with the 
privilege against self-incrimination. Only rarely, arbitrators re-
port, do they get a case in which a witness makes a direct issue 
of the privilege against self-incrimination where the problem is 
limited to the arbitration proceeding. One such case is an un-
reported one in which the employee was discharged for having 
advised other employees to violate a clear company rule. In the 
course of the arbitration hearing the dischargee refused to take 
the stand and testify on the question of whether he had given 
such advice. He justified his position on the basis of the privilege 
against self-incrimination. The arbitrator could not force the 
grievant to take the stand, but he did infer from the employee's 
failure to do so that he had probably given the advice. Of course, 
in arbitration, as in court cases, it is difficult to know how much 
weight to assign to the adverse inference. Usually the grievant 
defendant's greatest difficulty is not the inference arising out of 
refusal to testify, but the fact that there is other evidence in the 
record which remains uncontradicted because the defendant re-
fuses to speak. 
Many arbitrators feel that the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion has no place in the arbitration proceeding. Often they ex-
plain this on the ground that the arbitratiqn is not a criminal 
proceeding. Since the courts have long held, as indicated previ-
ously, that the privilege extends beyond criminal proceedings, 
this may be an unsound ground for an otherwise correct con-
clusion. Would not the following rules adequately serve the pur-
pose in dealing with the privilege against self-incrimination in 
arbitration proceedings? 
1. Since the privilege against self-incrimination owes much 
of its existence to historical developments which have no rele-
vancy to the field of arbitration, the privilege should have only 
a very limited application to arbitration. 
2. When the grievant claims the privilege against self-in-
crimination for purposes of the arbitration proceeding, either 
without reference to another forum or on the ground that a 
54 McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 135 (1954) • 
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criminal proceeding elsewhere is pending against him for the 
same offense, he should be advised that a failure or refusal to 
testify may give rise to an inference against him. 
3. An adverse inference arising out of failure or refusal to 
testify, whether before the arbitrator or elsewhere, will rarely, if 
ever, be sufficient by itself to sustain the penalty which has been 
imposed. 
4. An adverse inference arising out of failure or refusal to 
testify before the arbitrator or elsewhere may, when coupled with 
unrefuted evidence against the grievant, be used to sustain the 
penalty. 
5. Insofar as the privilege against self-incrimination has any 
standing before an arbitration tribunal it should not apply to 
other than testimonial compulsion. 
In brief, these rules give a minimum scope in arbitration to 
the privilege against self-incrimination. This, it is submitted, is 
desirable. Justice can, as Cardozo so eloquently pointed out, sur-
vive without the privilege.55 Employment with a given employer 
is not a right.56 The importation into the field of arbitration of 
concepts having little relevance to the special problems before 
the tribunal would be unfortunate. 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
There appear to be very few reported arbitration cases which 
squarely face the question of whether evidence obtained by an 
illegal search is admissible. Interestingly enough, one of the few 
was decided in 1946 by Joseph D. Lohman, who has recently 
been appointed Dean of the School of Criminology at the Univer-
sity of California at Berkeley. In that case,57 a woman had been 
discharged for violation of a company rule which prohibited 
possession by employees of a dangerous knife on company pre-
mises. The evidence showed that a guard had allegedly seen the 
knife in the woman's purse through the open door of her locker. 
This information was conveyed to a supervisor who then asked 
the grievant to report to the office on her way off duty. The em-
ployee, without being told the reason for the request, was then 
55 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937). 
56 U.S. Steel Corp. v. Nichols, 229 F.2d 396, 399 (6th Cir. 1956). 
57 Campbell Soup Co., 2 Lab. Arb. 27 (1946) • 
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asked by the head guard to empty her purse. This she did, with 
the result that the knife was revealed. A majority of the arbitra-
tion board ruled that the evidence of possession of the knife was 
inadmissible and that the discharge was unjustified. Although 
the whole incident took place on company property, the majority 
said that "the aggrieved's locker and purse continue inviolate as 
the private realm of the individual and are not to be searched or 
seized in an illegal fashion."58 The opinion speaks of entrapment, 
self-incrimination, and illegal search and seizure. One gets the 
impression that the majority felt there were other, and better, 
ways in which the company could implement its undeniably valid 
rule. It is a little difficult to know just how much weight to assign 
to each of the respective factors relied upon by the arbitrators. 
A 1957 decision,59 involving an employee who was discharged 
for "writing numbers" on company property, furnishes an inter-
esting comparison with the above case. In that case plant protec-
tion officers detained a cook at the company's canteen and asked 
him to go to the plant protection office. Enroute a numbers slip 
was found in a package of cigarettes carried by the employee. At 
the plant protection office the employee was told to empty his 
pockets, which he did. Several other slips were then discovered. 
This evidence was turned over to a city magistrate who tried the 
defendant and· found him guilty. Subsequently the man was dis-
charged. No point was apparently made of an alleged illegal 
seizure, and the discharge was sustained without referring to the 
question. 
Most of the arbitrators who have been asked about illegal 
search and seizure cases indicate that they have never had such 
an issue. However, there are some unreported cases in which 
arbitrators say they have dealt with the following situations: 
I. The company furnished lockers and padlocks to individual 
employees. Upon suspicion that an employee was stealing tools, 
the company opened his locker in his absence and without his 
permission and found some missing tools. The arbitrator ad-
mitted the evidence. 
2. An employee had developed a gadget for his machine 
which would greatly speed up production. However, he used it 
58 Id. at 31. 
59 Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 29 Lab. Arb. 778 (1957) . 
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covertly and refused to enter it in the company's suggestion sys-
tem. Knowing of the gadget the company attempted, unsuccess-
fully, to take it out of his personal tool box. When the employee 
was discharged the arbitrator held that the company could not 
search the tool box. 
3. An employee, X, was suspected by his fellow employees of 
stealing their tools. They broke into his locker (which belonged 
to the company but had on it his personal lock). While this was 
taking place the company guard came along and found that the 
locker contained tools belonging to the company. X was dis-
charged and the arbitrator allowed the evidence to be entered on 
the theory that the company did not break into the locker. 
4. An employee was suspected of stealing inventory. Com-
pany guards went to his home when he was not there, and were 
permitted by the man's wife to search his house. They found 
evidence which resulted in his discharge. The arbitrator per-
mitted the evidence to be entered in the record. 
5. An employee, X, was opposed to the contract which his 
union officers had negotiated with the company, and which was 
about to be offered to the local for ratification. X started making 
notes for a speech on the floor of the meeting in opposition to the 
proposed contract. The foreman found the notes and attempted 
to get them away from X. In the process the notes were torn. X 
refused to give up the balance of the notes and was fired. The 
arbitrator reinstated him on the ground that the notes were his 
personal property. 
None of these cases deny the right of the company to impose, 
as a condition of employment, an inspection of the employee's 
clothes and packages on entering and leaving the plant. 60 Arbi-
trators know that industrial pilferage is a major problem, and 
there is no disposition to interfere with proper rules to control it. 
At common law the admissibility of evidence was not affected 
by the illegality of the means through which it had been ob-
tained. 61 However, in 1941 the Supreme Court ruled that illegal-
ly obtained evidence was inadmissible in the federal courts, 62 and 
60 See Sunbeam Corp. reports in Bus. Week, Feb. II, 1956, p. 148; id. March 31, 
1956, p. 167. 
61 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2183, at 7 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). 
62 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) • 
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in a very recent decision, Mapp v. Ohio,63 has ruled that all evi-
dence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Consti-
tution is inadmissible even in state courts. Since the latter deci-
sion was placed squarely on constitutional grounds it may also 
wipe out the "standing" requirement, which had been imposed 
by the lower federal courts, and which considerably diluted the 
impact of the 1941 decision.64 The effect of the "standing" re-
quirement was to impose on one seeking to suppress illegally ob-
tained evidence the necessity of showing a definite interest in 
either the premises searched, or the property seized, or both. Un-
less the defendant insisted that the property belonged to him he 
had no standing to challenge its admission. But if he claimed 
the property he waived his privilege against self-incrimination. 
The constitutional protection which the Mapp case extends 
against illegally obtained evidence applies to governmental, rather 
than private, acts. Conceivably there are circumstances under 
which a private arbitration award could be considered govern-
mental action for purposes of invoking the constitutional protec-
tions. The more important question is whether arbitrators ought 
to evolve a rule against the receipt of illegally obtained evidence 
simply because this would contribute to the fairness and integrity 
of the arbitration process. Here one suspects there is a great dif-
ference between the privilege against self-incrimination, for in-
stance, and the use of illegally obtained evidence. The difference 
is both theoretical and practical. The historic influences which 
gave rise to the self-incrimination rule have little or no relevance 
to arbitration. On the other hand, the fact that the modern in-
dustrial age requires most individuals to work for another, rather 
than for themselves, should not necessarily deprive them of his-
toric rights with respect to private property. And on the purely 
practical level, management can in fact establish rules and pro-
cedures which will adequately protect its business without resort-
ing to illegal searches. The individual is entitled to know the 
rules under which he is working, and these normally preclude 
illegal searches and seizures. 
Interrogation reveals that all arbitrators agree that a company 
may impose reasonable rules as to the search of one's person and 
63 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
64 See Comment, 55 M1cH. L. REv. 567 (1957) . 
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property where such rules are made a condition of employment. 
Many arbitrators would permit companies to use evidence ob-
tained without the knowledge or consent of the employee if it is 
obtained from company property (e.g., a locker), even though· 
the property is momentarily under the control of the employee. 
Few, if any, arbitrators think that a company ought to be per-
mitted to use evidence obtained by breaking and entering an 
employee's personal property, even though the property is 
located on the plant premises. There is a difference of opinion 
among arbitrators as to the use of evidence of this type when the 
employee's personal property is searched without his consent, but 
without the necessity for entering by force. 
Since all arbitrators agree that a company can, as a condition 
of employment, impose reasonable rules as to search of one's 
person and property, why should there be any other guideline 
for what to do about illegally obtained evidence? In the absence 
of a rule known to the employee, if evidence is obtained without 
his consent and from property under his control ( even though 
without a breaking and entering) , should it not be barred? There 
is no apparent handicap to the company in such a rule, and it con-
tributes to the employee's sense of dignity. Surely human values 
are not to be completely ignored in the industrial context. 
WIRETAPPING 
Wiretapping has apparently not constituted much of a prob-
lem before arbitrators. Only one reported case had been located, 
and in response to an inquiry no other cases were disclosed. 
Nevertheless, the subject is deserving of comment, if for no other 
reason than its early and largely disreputable history in the field 
of labor-management relations. There was a time when em-
ployers' associations, Pinkerton offices, and so-called "vigilante" 
committees, which were hostile to labor, made widespread use 
of wiretapping.65 And there have been many unfair labor prac-
tice cases before the NLRB which involved employer use of tapped 
wires in connection with alleged anti-union activity. 66 
65 Hearings on S. 266 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Education 
and Labor, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1585-88 (1937) • 
66 Chesapeake &: Potomac Tel. Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 1122 (1952); Mid-Continent Petro• 
Ieum Corp., 54 N.L.R.B. 912 (1944) . 
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There is one reported arbitration case involving the ware-
housing operation of the Sun Drug Co. which deals with the prob-
lem of wiretapping.67 In that case, outsiders had complained to 
the company that "numbers-writing" was being carried on within 
the warehouse. In the course of its investigation the company in-
stalled a microphone in the telephone booth and connected it to 
a recording machine. After gathering incontrovertible evidence 
against one of its employees the company turned the evidence 
over to the district attorney who then carried the investigation 
further. Three detectives apprehended the employee as he left 
the telephone booth following completion of a conversation to 
which they had listened on the recording machine. The employee 
admitted writing numbers, and both money and slips were con-
fiscated from him. The employee was discharged and in arbitra-
tion the union contended that the company had entrapped the 
individual, that placing numbers bets was common knowledge to 
all employees in the warehouse, that the employee accrued no 
profit from this activity, and that his discharge really stemmed 
from his activity as a shop steward rather than from writing num-
bers. There was a Pennsylvania statute which made number 
writing illegal, but there was also a statute making it a mis-
demeanor to intercept a communication by telephone.68 The lat-
ter act specifically stated: "Except as proof in a suit or prosecu-
tion for a violation of this act, no evidence obtained as a result 
of an unlawful interception shall be admissible in any such pro-
ceeding."69 The opinion in Sun Drug Co. does not indicate whether 
the union argued that the wiretapping evidence was inadmissible, 
but it does say: "Suffice it to say that while the legality of the 
means by which information has been gathered is for other 
authorities to determine, it is sufficient for the purpose of arbi-
tration, based upon the uncontroverted facts in the instant case, 
for the arbitrator to sustain the discharge."70 Thus, for all practi-
cal purposes, the evidence was received. 
Although the Sun case had not been decided at the time arbi-
trators were being asked what they would do with a wiretapping 
case, it turned out that the hypothetical example which was used 
67 Sun Drug Co., 31 Lab. Arb. 191 (1958) • 
68 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2443 (1958). 
69 Ibid. 
70 31 Lab. Arb. 191, 194 (1958) • 
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in the interrogation almost exactly paralleled that case. Arbitra-
tors were badly split in their responses. Many said that they would 
not admit evidence which had been illegally obtained; others 
said that they would follow the law of the particular state as to 
admissibility; and still others pointed out that illegal methods 
used in securing the evidence did not impair its truth or relevancy. 
In view of the dearth of arbitration experience with wire-
tapping, it is likely that arbitrators will look to the law for guid-
ance in dealing with the problem. If so, they may find less help 
than they had expected. More than thirty years ago the Supreme 
Court, despite an eloquent dissent by Mr. Justice Brandeis, settled 
on the rule that neither the unreasonable searches and seizures 
provision of the fourth amendment, nor the self-incrimination 
provisions of the fifth amendment, were violated by the intro-
duction of evidence obtained by tapping wires.71 Subsequently 
Congress passed the Federal Communications Act, which included 
the provision that "no person not being authorized by the sender 
shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the 
existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such 
intercepted communication to any person .... "72 Supreme Court 
decisions then established that the act applied to federal officers 
and forbade the introduction in federal courts of intercepted mes-
sages,73 or evidence gained thereby;74 that intra-state messages 
were protected from disclosure equally with interstate communi-
cations;w and that the consent of one party to the conversation, 
secured by confronting him with recording of the conversation 
and by promises of leniency, was not "authorization by the 
sender" within the meaning of the act. 76 On the other hand the 
Supreme Court also held that it was not a violation of the act to 
use a detectaphone to overhear the words of one party to the 
conversation, and if this was done without a trespass it was not a 
search or seizure;77 that only the participants in the conversation 
may object to the use of intercepted conversations since they are 
71 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
72 Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1104 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1958) . 
73 Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937). 
74 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). 
76 Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939). 
76 Ibid. 
77 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942). 
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the only ones whose privacy has been invaded;78 that the Federal 
Communications Act does not require the exclusion of wiretap 
evidence in the state courts;79 and that a conversation which is 
overheard on a regularly-used telephone extension, with the con-
sent of the person who is both the subscriber to the extension and 
a party to the conversation, is admissible because it is not an 
"intercepted" message within the meaning of the act.80 All of this 
may have been complicated, however, by two decisions of the 
Supreme Court at its most recent term. In Mapp v. Ohio81 the 
Court held for the first time that evidence obtained by searches 
and seizures in violation of the Constitution were constitutionally 
inadmissible in state courts. But at the same time, in a per curiam 
opinion, it upheld a lower court decision denying an injunction 
against the use of illegally obtained wiretap evidence in a state 
court.82 In point of time, the Mapp case was the last decided. 
Does this foreshadow a change in the rule with respect to the 
admissibility of wiretap evidence in state courts? 
Many states have wiretap statutes. They vary in type from the 
Pennsylvania statute, under which evidence obtained as the re-
sult of unlawful interception is inadmissible, 83 to the New York 
constitutional provision which permits wiretapping after obtain-
ing a warrant in accordance with the state law.84 Some states, 
like New Hampshire, have no statute and admit wiretap 
evidence.85 
Unless and until the Supreme Court holds the introduction of 
wiretap evidence inadmissible in state courts-and this decision 
may not be far off-an easy rule for arbitrators to follow would be 
to abide by the law of the state in which the case is being heard. 
But such a rule would not be entirely satisfactory. Multi-plant 
companies and unions would find themselves with different rules, 
depending on the state in which the incident took place. More-
over, such an automatic rule would give no consideration to the 
differences between an employer's use of wiretap evidence to 
78 Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942). 
79 Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952). 
so Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957). 
81 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
82 Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S. 458 (1961). 
83 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2443 (1958) • 
84 N.Y. CoNsr. art. I, § 12. 
85 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2184 (b), at 57 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1957). 
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maintain production and plant discipline, and police use of wire-
tap evidence in criminal cases. Clearly there are some differences. 
An employee is on company property, and perhaps on company 
time. The telephone which he is using may very well be the 
company's. Is this not different from tapping an individual's 
private phone at his home or business? At least one well-known 
arbitrator thought so, for he said in no uncertain terms that the 
problems of the public prosecutor in trying to use wiretap evi-
dence in court in no way related to the in-plant problem. 
In the last analysis, one must weigh in the balance the prob-
lem of the employer in maintaining production and discipline 
against the privacy of the individual--even though the latter is 
in an industrial plant. This calls for a value judgment on which 
there can be legitimate differences of opinion. The facts of the 
case might well influence the decision. Should an employer who 
is harassed with in-plant gambling be denied the right to intro-
duce in an arbitration hearing evidence obtained by tapping his 
own telephone during working hours? On the other hand, sup-
pose the employer gets his evidence when the police, at the em-
ployer's suggestion, tap a public telephone across the street from 
the plant and during the noon hour? 
Wiretapping is at best a dirty business.86 Surely it has no 
place in the plant under any save extraordinary circumstances. 
Would it not be better for arbitrators generally to discourage the 
use of such evidence? And at the present time can any better rule 
be suggested? 
THE LIE DETECTOR 
Prior to 1959 only one reported arbitration case has been 
located which involved the question of the admissibility and 
weight of lie-detector evidence.87 Responses from arbitrators con-
firm the conclusion that there were, indeed, few such cases. How-
ever, there is reason to believe that the problem is going to be-
come more important. There were at least five reported cases in 
1959,88 and since then there has been a steady sprinkling of 
86 See generally DASH, SCHWARTZ & KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROPPERS (1959). 
87 Allen Indus., Inc., 26 Lab. Arb. 363 (1956) • 
88 Publishers' Ass'n, 32 Lab. Arb. 44 (1959) ; Marathon Elec. Mfg. Corp., 31 Lab. 
Arb. 1040 (1959) ; Coronet Phosphate Co., 31 Lab. Arb. 515 (1958) • 
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cases.89 Personnel literature suggests that the polygraph is very 
widely used in American industry for testing prospective or 
present employees of banks, department stores, chain stores, etc., 
for honesty in previous employment, honesty during current em-
ployment, or in connection with a particular theft.90 Massachu-
- setts has found this practice sufficiently distasteful to pass a law 
forbidding an employer, under penalty of a 200-dollar fine, to 
require or subject any employee to a lie detector test as a condi-
tion of employment or continued employment.91 A similar bill 
was under consideration in New York in the spring of 1961. A 
major drug manufacturer urged its defeat on the ground that 
polygraph tests aided in the selection of trustworthy employees-
a consideration which was particularly important where narcotics 
were involved.92 And a consultant who specialized in pre-employ-
ment examinations for bus drivers also opposed the bill on the 
ground that polygraph tests helped to detect potential child 
molesters, on-the-job drinkers, narcotics users, and accident-prone 
persons.93 
A number of the arbitration cases involving lie detectors have 
been discharge cases. Interestingly enough, in some of the cases 
the company wanted the employee to take a lie detector test or 
have an inference of guilt drawn against him, while in other cases 
the employee wanted to take a lie detector test to establish· his 
innocence. Generally, arbitrators have attached no significance 
to an employee's refusal to take a test,94 but in one case the arbi-
trator appeared to give it considerable weight.95 On the question 
of admissibility arbitrators have tended to rule against lie-detector 
evidence whether offered for the purpose of proving innocence 
or guilt.116 
Two other cases illustrate the limited significance which lie 
89 See, e.g., B. F. Goodrich Tire Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 552 (1961); Brass-Craft Mfg. Co., 
36 Lab. Arb. 1177 (1961). 
90 Cf. McEvoy, The Lie Detector Goes into Business, Readers Digest, Feb. 1941, 
p. 69; Lie Detectors for Employees, Bus. Week, Sept. 16, 1939, p. 36. 
91 MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 149, § 19-B (Supp. 1961) • 
92 N.Y. Times, March 15, 1961, p. 41, col. I. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Publishers' Ass'n of New York City, 32 Lab. J\rb. 44, 48 (1959) . 
95 Allen Indus., Inc., 26 Lab. Arb. 363 (1956) . 
96 Brass-Craft Mfg. Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 1177 (1961); Marathon Elec. Mfg. Corp., 31 
Lab. Arb. 1040 (1959) . 
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detector tests seem to have in arbitration. In one of them117 false 
production reports had been filed under circumstances which 
made it impossible to pin the blame on any individual or indi-
viduals. The company therefore deducted a proportionate amount 
of pay from the wages of all employees in the department. The 
union protested that this was unfair because it penalized innocent 
employees. The company then sought what amounted to a 
declaratory judgment from the arbitrator which would permit 
it to insist that all of the employees take a lie detector test. Those 
who refused, or failed to pass the test, would then have the 
amount of money which had been ·wrongfully paid deducted from 
their wages. Those who passed the test would not be so charged. 
The arbitrator held that the employer could not impose a lie 
detector test wholesale, when it lacked a basis for a formal accu-
sation against any given employee. In the other case,98 a company 
was losing spark plugs from its Chicago warehouse. By 1960 
losses were running as high as 50,000 dollars, and no system of 
prevention seemed to work. Since everything pointed to an inside 
job the company gave lie detector tests to all warehouse em-
ployees. The employees agreed to submit to such tests and the 
first round showed that three employees were lying. Two of 
them refused to take any further tests, while the third took the 
test over and again failed. The company then suspended all three 
for failure to cooperate with the investigation. The arbitrator 
held that the suspensions were unjustified since no evidence con-
nected any of the three employees with the thefts, and their con-
sent should not operate as a waiver in view of the "implicit social 
threat" of refusing. 
Although the reported cases would indicate that arbitrators 
are tending more and more to exclude lie-detector evidence, in-
quiry among arbitrators suggests that there are unreported cases 
in which arbitrators have admitted lie-detector evidence but given 
it little weight. 
In excluding lie-detector evidence arbitrators have tended 
to cite, in support of their position, the fact that courts typically 
do not admit it.99 The constitutional question of whether an 
individual can be required to take a lie detector test is unlikely 
97 General Am. Transp. Corp., 31 Lab. Arb. 355 (1958) • 
os B. F. Goodrich Tire Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 552 (1961). 
90 See Brass-Craft Mfg. Co., 36 Lab. _>.rb. 1177 (1961). 
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to arise, since the art of lie detection is not at the moment suffi-
ciently well developed to make a reliable test possible upon a 
person who is unwilling to submit.100 
No experienced arbitrator harbors the illusion that he can 
unerringly separate truth from falsehood in proceedings before 
him. There is evidence that the lie detector, in competent hands, 
is accurate about eighty percent of the time.101 This may well be 
substantially higher than the unaided judgment of the average 
arbitrator. But it does not follow that the lie detector will be a 
constructive addition to either the grievance procedure or the 
arbitration tribunal. Hardly a grievance arises which does not 
present some form of dispute as to what was said or done on a 
given occasion. Did the business agent privately agree in a tele-
phone conversation with the personnel manager that the com-
pany could make a certain promotion without having it con-
tested by the union? When an employee called in to report his 
absence did he say that he would be out for two days or only one? 
In the course of negotiations did the parties discuss clause X and 
agree that it was to be interpreted in the same way as clause Y 
in a companion contract? Is the foreman or the production 
worker telling the truth with respect to their altercation? 
Can a union live with its members if, when a grievance arises 
on which there is a conflict of testimony, it accepts resolution of 
the grievance through the lie detector? Can a company maintain 
morale among its supervisors if, when their reports are con-
tradicted by employees, the company uses the lie detector to tell 
the truth? Suppose the business agent did tell the personnel 
manager that the company could make a promotion without 
opposition from the union, and then found that his membership 
felt strongly to the contrary. Does the company really want to 
prove that the business agent is lying? 
In summary, when arbitrators deny admission to lie-detector 
evidence, and decline to draw an inference against the employee 
who refuses to take such a test, is not their position sound? Sound 
not just in the court sense that such tests are still unreliable, but 
in the policy sense that the lie detector has little to contribute to 
100 Trovillo, Scientific Proof of Credibility, 22 TENN. L. REV. 743 (1953) • 
101 Cureton, A Consensus as to the Validity of Polygraph Procedures, 22 TENN. L. 
REV. 728 (1953) • 
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the arbitration procedure. If there is to be any exception would 
it not be wise to limit it, as have the courts,1°2 to those cases where 
the parties have entered into an agreement and stipulation as to 
the use of the results? 
CONCLUSION 
Arbitrators have, happily, largely dispensed with the exclu-
sionary rules of evidence developed at common law for the jury 
trial system. One can say that this is a happy result because, in 
the colorful language of Judge Traynor, "just as no one wiII teII 
the emperor that he has no clothes, there are too few who will 
whisper that the law of evidence has too many."103 Even so there 
are situations in which evidence which may be relevant and of 
probative value should be excluded. Sometimes this is for con-
stitutional reasons, and other times it is simply for reasons of 
policy. 
Since the arbitration tribunal is private it is not likely that a 
constitutional question of due process wiII arise. But this could 
happen, at least in theory, in either of two ways. In a proceed-
ing to enforce an award the claim might be made that there was 
a denial of due process before the arbitrator. There is clear 
precedent for a holding that even privately-constituted tribunals 
must accord their constituents due process. Secondly, it is not 
beyond the realm of possibility that some future court will hold, 
under an expanded concept of what constitutes governmental 
action, that the labor arbitrator is an agent of the state and as such 
bound by the provisions of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 
Only a few of the issues here discussed are even remotely likely 
to raise a question of legal due process in the constitutional sense. 
More often it is policy which is involved-policy from the stand-
point of the arbitrator and the parties in the sense that the arbi-
tration process will have dignity, integrity, and fairness in every 
respect, and policy from the standpoint of the company and the 
union in that the methods which are used in processing and try-
ing grievances will contribute to the harmonious and productive 
relationship of the parties. 
102 See INBAU & REID, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 132-35 (3d ed. 
1953). 
10s Traynor, Law and Social Change in a Democratic Society, 1956 U. ILL. L.F. 234. 
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Arbitral experience in certain areas of evidence is meager. 
When sensitive personal rights are involved the experience of the 
courts may be instructive, though not necessarily binding. The 
attempt here has been to analyze certain problems and suggest 
guidelines for the future. Experience and the perspective of time 
and events will no doubt suggest variations. 
